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Is the Red Dragon Green?
Is the Red Dragon Green? An Examination of the Antecedents and
Consequences of Environmental Proactivity in China

Abstract
China is the world’s second largest economy and the largest emitter of carbon
dioxide, yet we know little about environmental proactivity in the most populated
country in the world. We address this gap through a survey of 161 Chinese companies
with two respondents per firm (N = 322) where we seek to identify the antecedents
and consequences of environmental proactivity. We identify two categorizations of
environmental proactivity: Environmental operational improvements and
environmental reporting. We find that ecological motivations and regulatory
stakeholder pressure are positively related to both types of environmental proactivity,
and external stakeholder pressure is negatively related to environmental reporting.
Furthermore, we find that (1) if a firm is environmentally proactive (as it relates to
either measure) and they are ecologically motivated, there is a positive and significant
cost advantage, and (2) if a firm makes use of environmental operational
improvement and they are competitively motivated, there is a positive and significant
reputation advantage. Implications for researchers, managers, and policy-makers in
China are discussed.

Key Words: China, Competitive Advantage, Environmental Proactivity, Motivation,
Reputation, Stakeholder Pressure
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Is the Red Dragon Green?
Is the Red Dragon Green? An Examination of the Antecedents and
Consequences of Environmental Proactivity in China
We are now undoubtedly witnessing the dramatic ecological effects of the

industrial revolution which include but are not limited to climate change,
deforestation, depleted and polluted oceans and fresh water, and unprecedented losses
in biodiversity (Pacala and Socolow, 2004). Scientists and policy makers have warned
that we are now entering the sixth great extinction since the birth of the planet, the last
of which occurred during the reign of the dinosaurs in the late cretaceous period
(Gore, 2009). Unlike the past, however, where natural events such as asteroid
collisions or naturally occurring climate change were to blame, today, the blame rests
primarily with humans. The anthropogenic causes of our current ecological state are
garnering increasing attention within academia, and because organizations are a major
contributing factor, management scholars have increasingly turned their attention to
this important area (Berchicci and King, 2007; Lockett, Moon and Visser, 2006;
Starik, 2006).
In this study, we investigate proactive environmental strategies, meaning
strategies “that seek to reduce the environmental impacts of operations beyond
regulatory requirements” (Delmas, Hoffman, and Kuss, 2011: 119). In particular, our
research focuses on the antecedents (i.e., managerial motivations and stakeholder
pressures) and consequences (i.e., cost advantages, reputation and innovation) of
environmental proactivity in China.
To date, research examining environmental proactivity has tended to
investigate Western societies (e.g., Darnall, Henriques and Sadorsky, 2010; Delmas
and Toffel, 2008; Rueda-Manzanares, Aragon-Correa and Sharma, 2008).
Consequently, current management research in the area does not adequately reflect
the emergence of developing countries as major players in the world economy.
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Similarly, research examining the more general corporate social responsibility (CSR)
area has overwhelmingly focused on developed markets (Gao, 2009; Ip, 2008). This
focus is not consistent with the economic growth we have seen in emerging markets.
We believe that a close examination on environmental proactivity and its antecedents
in different institutional contexts is important given the global economy and global
environmental problems that require contingent solutions. For example, the
antecedents and consequences of environmental proactivity may be different in China
versus the United States or other Western countries. As the second largest economy in
the world and the largest emerging market, China, is of particular interest (Ye and
Zhang, 2011). Despite China’s tremendous economic growth, we know little of its
growth as it relates to CSR and environmental responsibility specifically (Gao, 2009).
As the largest carbon emitter in the world and a country that burns twice as much coal
as the United States (Gore, 2009) the dearth of academic research examining the
environmental performance of China represents a large gap in the literature.
Furthermore, it is important to investigate environmental proactivity in China
to supplement our understanding and conceptualization of this complex construct. In
particular, we need to study it in different contexts to see how it may, or may not be,
contingent on a particular institutional environment. Furthermore, China presents an
interesting context to study environmental proactivity because of the need to balance
tremendous economic growth with equally tremendous environmental damage. As an
example of the latter, Chinese officials currently estimate that approximately 700,000
people die annually in China from causes related to poor environmental conditions
(Time, March 25, 2013). All economies must balance a desire for continuous growth
with the recognition of limited resources in a finite planet. China represents a
dramatic example where this need for balance is highly visible. Lastly, researchers

3	
  
	
  

4	
  
	
  

Is the Red Dragon Green?

have increasingly found that environmental management is not a universal
prescription or a one-size-fits-all approach (Barnett, 2007; Berchicci and King, 2007;
Brammer and Millington, 2008). Given the significantly different context in China
versus most Western societies, we can reasonably expect differences in their
environmental proactivity.
To examine the antecedents and consequences from a proactive environmental
approach in China we surveyed 161 companies in the province of Sichuan with two
representatives per firm—the environmental manager and a top executive—for a total
of 322 respondents. We found that an ecological motivation and regulatory
stakeholder pressures were positively related to environmental proactivity, and
external stakeholder pressures were negatively related to environmental proactivity.
We also found that an ecological motivation was necessary to gain a perceived cost
competitive advantage from environmental proactivity, and that a competitive
motivation was necessary to gain a perceived reputation competitive advantage from
environmental proactivity.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: First, we review the literature
specific to the variables in our study model. Second, we develop hypotheses to (1)
explain environmental proactivity related to motivations and stakeholder pressures,
and (2) determine the relationship between environmental proactivity and competitive
advantage. Third, we describe our methodology and results. Lastly, before
concluding, we present our discussion, and the implications and limitations in our
study.
Literature Review
Proactive environmental strategies exist beyond what is required by law
(Delmas et al., 2011; Sharma 2000). Such strategies seek to minimize a corporation’s
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negative environmental impacts and perhaps even improve current environmental
conditions. Environmental proactivity is often demonstrated through environmental
operational improvements (e.g, waste reduction, closed-loop systems, life-cycle
analysis, employee training) and environmental reporting (e.g., internal and external
accounting procedures, environmental indicators and goals, sustainability reports)
(Darnall et al. 2010; Delmas et al. 2011; Hart, 2005; Nash and Ehrenfeld, 1997;
Welford, 1998). We accordingly examine two types of environmental proactivity:
operational improvements and environmental reporting.
In their comprehensive qualitative study Bansal and Roth (2000) identified
three

environmental

motivations:

competitive,

legitimation

and

ecological

responsibility. A competitive motivation stems from a desire to further an
organization’s competitiveness and profitability. A legitimation motivation stems
from a desire to be perceived as legitimate by stakeholders. Lastly, an ecological
motivation stems from a desire to protect the natural environment. We view a
legitimacy motivation as very similar to a competitive motivation, in that the desire
for legitimacy is ultimately a desire to enhance the competitiveness of the
organization. We, therefore, include the legitimation motivation as part of the
competitive motivation where an organization seeks to further their competitiveness
and profitability.
While the importance of each type of motivation is likely to vary based on the
context, we anticipate that these motivations identified in a Western context will still
apply in China. In particular, Chinese managers are just as likely as Western
managers to be attracted to environmental proactivity because of the potential of a
competitive advantage (a competitive or legitimation motivation) or because they care
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for the natural environment (ecological motivation). Accordingly, we seek to measure
both types of motivation in our study.
The literature identifies a second common motivation for the adoption of
proactive environmental strategies, stakeholder pressures. Researchers have found
that proactive environmental strategies are related to perceived stakeholder pressure
from regulators (Delmas and Montes-Sanchez, 2010; Delmas and Montiel, 2008;
Majumdar and Marcus, 2001) and external stakeholders (Darnall et al., 2010; Delmas,
2001; Hart, 2005; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996, 1999; Sharma and Henriques,
2005). Similarly, given the Chinese context of our research we focus on these two
particular groups of stakeholders. Researchers have found that in the adoption of CSR
practices of firms within China, both internal (i.e., employees) and societal
stakeholders (i.e., general public, NGOs, unions, etc.) yield little power (Lin, 2010;
Liu et al., 2010; Tsoi, 2010). We accordingly limit our investigation to external and
regulatory stakeholders, although as we state in our methodology, we do include other
stakeholder groups to confirm they are not applicable to our study context.
Extant research in China mainly focuses on the role of regulators or political
influence in determining firms’ environmental strategies or performance. This focus
stems from the traditional perspective of the ‘state-led’ pseudo market of China where
government plays a significant role in shaping corporate behaviors (FranceschHuidobro, Lo, and Tang, 2012; Lo and Fryxell, 2005; Lo, Fryxell, and Van Rooij,
2009; Ma and Ortolano 2000; Tang, Lo and Fryxell, 2003; Tao and Mah, 2009; Van
Rooij, 2006). Nevertheless, studies that also investigate motivations or the role of
other types of stakeholders have started to emerge (e.g., Liu et al., 2010; Zhang et al.,
2008; Zhu, Sarkis and Lai, 2007). For example, Zhang et al. (2008) found that
regulatory pressure was not statistically related to the corporate environmental
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management performance of their sampled firms. They further argued that this was
because firms in the studied region, Jiangsu Province in China, have achieved basic
compliance to local environmental standards and laws. In contrast, Zhu et al. (2007)
evidenced the influence of both regulatory and market pressures on the adoption of
green supply chain management (GSCM) by Chinese automobile supply chain
enterprises.
Examining the consequences to environmental proactivity, research has
moved beyond a simple examination of the effects on profitability to more specific
competitive advantages (Berchicci and King, 2007). Similarly, in this study we
examine competitive advantages manifested through costs, reputation and innovation
(Delmas et al., 2011). While competitive advantages to environmental proactivity
have been well documented in Western contexts (e.g., Ambec and Lanoie, 2008;
Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Hart, 1995; Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Miles and Covin, 2000;
Rooney, 1993; Russo and Fouts, 1997), we know of no research that has empirically
examined the relationship between environmental proactivity and competitive
advantage in the largest emerging market, China (Ye and Zhang, 2011).
In this study we expand on previous literature by examining environmental
proactivity within China. Yet our study is more than a reliability test of previous
research applied to a different study context. Not only do we adapt our variables and
hypotheses to the specific study context to enhance relevance, but we also
consistently find differences in the antecedents and consequences of environmental
proactivity in China versus that of Western countries. This furthers our
conceptualization of environmental proactivity and supports the contention that
environmental management is not a universal prescription or a one-size-fits-all
approach (Barnett, 2007; Berchicci and King, 2007; Brammer and Millington, 2008).

7	
  
	
  

8	
  
	
  

Is the Red Dragon Green?

Hypothesis Development
To garner an understanding of environmental proactivity in China we seek to
understand the antecedents to greater proactivity and the consequences. Specifically,
we examine motivations for environmental proactivity and stakeholder pressures as
antecedents, and competitive advantage through cost advantages, reputation and
innovation as consequences. Figure 1 represents our study model.
-------------------------------------------------Insert Figure 1 about here
---------------------------------------------------Motivation and Environmental Proactivity
Bansal and Roth (2000) state that it is important to understand the motives for
environmental proactivity for two reasons. The first is limited to organizational
theorists who can use this understanding to predict when such behaviour is likely to
occur. The second is broader with implications for researchers, managers, and
governments who can learn how to foster environmentally proactive organizations.
Given such implications, it is not surprising that a number of researchers have
investigated reasons for environmental proactivity. Researchers have found that
organizational champions pushing for a more proactive environmental approach
(Andersson and Bateman, 2000), regulations (Marcus and Geffen, 1998; Majumdar
and Marcus, 2001), financial benefits (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt
and Rynes, 2003), and managerial cognitions including interpretations of
environmental issues as threats or opportunities (Ghobadian et al., 1995; Lee and
Rhee, 2007; Sharma, 2000) can all influence a firm’s environmental approach.
In their detailed qualitative analysis Bansal and Roth (2000) identified three
main motivations for environmental proactivity: competitiveness, legitimation and
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ecological responsibility. Competitiveness represents the belief that environmental
proactivity will improve long-term profitability. Legitimation represents the belief
that environmental proactivity will enable firms to attain the necessary resources,
reduce uncertainty, and ultimately enhance their survivability (DiMaggio and Powell,
1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Lastly, ecological responsibility represents the belief
that environmental proactivity is the right thing to do from a moral and ethical
standpoint. As stated above, we combined the competitiveness and legitimation
motivations as we viewed the ultimate end to these motives to be increased
competitiveness.
We sought to examine to what extent these two types of motivation were
influential in determining the environmental proactivity of Chinese firms. Given that
Bansal and Roth (2000) qualitatively identified these types of motivations as
determinants of greater environmental responsibility, we predict a positive
relationship between each type and environmental proactivity.
We believe this is particularly applicable within China because Chinese firms
are increasingly incorporating environmental management into their overall corporate
social responsibility practices, primarily because of influences from the different
levels of Chinese governments and external parties from developed countries (Lai and
Wong, 2012; Lo et al. 2009; Sarkis, Ni and Zhu, 2011; Tang et al., 2003; Yuan, Bi
and Moriguichi, 2006). Similarly, more and more Chinese firms link such practices to
their economic analysis or personal moral requirements (Wang and Qian, 2011).
A competitive motivation stems from a belief that a firm can gain a
competitive advantage through an environmental proactive strategy. Indeed, research
has found that environmental proactivity can reduce costs by lowering compliance
costs, reducing or avoiding legal liabilities, reducing waste, and improving efficiency
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and productivity (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008; Hart, 1995; Hart and Ahuja, 1996;
Rooney, 1993). It may improve legitimacy (Bansal and Clelland, 2004), and
strengthen a firm’s reputation (Hart, 1995; Miles and Covin, 2000). It may also lead
to the development of new market opportunities and better access to markets (Ambec
and Lanoie, 2008), product differentiation (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008; Porter and van
der Linde, 1995), and the selling of pollution control technology (Ambec and Lanoie,
2008). With so many potential advantages to an environmentally proactive approach,
a desire for greater competiveness can lead to environmental proactivity.
H1: A competitiveness motivation will be positively related to environmental
proactivity.
In addition, managers may simply be motivated to engage in environmental
proactivity because they believe it is the right thing to do from a moral or ethical
standpoint (Bansal and Roth, 2000). We can reasonably expect that if managers are
motivated by ecological responsibility this will lead to greater environmental
proactivity. That is, if a manager believes that environmental proactivity is important
and the right thing to do, then this will be related to environmental proactivity within
the organization.
H2: An ecological responsibility motivation will be positively related to
environmental proactivity.
Stakeholder Pressure and Environmental Proactivity
We define stakeholders as “any group or individual who can affect or is
affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984: 46), or
in other words, as someone who has a stake in the organization. Ultimately, these
stakeholders pose various institutional pressures (i.e., coercive, normative, and
mimetic pressures) that motivate firms to enhance or limit environmental proactivity
(Darnall et al., 2010; Delmas, 2001; Hart, 2005; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996, 1999;
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Sharma and Henriques, 2005). In theory, all stakeholders are important to an
organization, but in reality, firms must necessarily limit the importance they can
attach to various stakeholder groups (Jamali, 2008; Lee, 2011). Indeed, researchers
have noted that some stakeholders are of higher importance than others (Davis and
Thompson, 1994; Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997).
Researchers studying emerging markets have theorized that stakeholder
pressures are stronger in developed than in developing markets where social and
environmental responsibility are of less importance to stakeholders in general (Gao,
2009; Li and Zhang, 2010; Sharfman and Fernando, 2008; Ye and Zhang, 2011).
However, we know of little empirical research that supports this contention or
research that shows how pressures might differ per stakeholder group. Indeed, even
within China we can expect differences in stakeholder pressures across geographic
areas. For example, local residents in some urban areas of China may have higher
environmental awareness due to variance in institutional and economic variances
across regions	
  (Huang et al., 2006; Liu and Lu, 2002). However, overall, internal and
societal stakeholders have yet to play a strong role in terms of monitoring business’
environmental activities (Tang and Zhan, 2008; Yang, 2005).
By nature, external stakeholders (e.g., consumers, suppliers, competitors, trade
associations, banks, etc.) are limited in their capacities to influence firm behaviour
through external and indirect means (Sharma and Henriques, 2005). That is, they must
be perceived as important by internal (or regulatory) stakeholders who have the ability
to influence firm behaviour. External stakeholders seeking to influence firm
environmental proactivity may do so through strict contract or purchase requirements,
protests, boycotts, negative media attention, and through attempts to intensify
regulatory requirements, exerting coercive pressures on firms. Firms seeking to avoid
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negative public attention may then be driven toward greater environmental proactivity
(Bansal and Roth, 2000) by showing their external stakeholders (e.g., consumers,
suppliers) green profiles (Arora and Cason, 1996).
Research in China has found that external stakeholders from developed
countries are pressuring Chinese firms in their supply chain to increase their
environmental performance (Lai and Wong, 2012; Zhu et al., 2007). In addition, both
international and local customers in China are increasingly demanding greater
environmental proactivity from Chinese firms (e.g., Lau and Waldmeir, 2010; Sarkis
et al., 2011; Yuan et al., 2006). Accordingly, we predict that perceived pressures from
external stakeholders will be related to greater environmental proactivity:
H3: Perceived external stakeholder pressure will be positively related to
environmental proactivity.
Regulatory stakeholders include government officials with the power and
authority to create and enforce environmental standards (Darnall et al., 2010; Fineman
and Clarke, 1996; Francesch-Huidobro et al., 2012). Firms are likely to place high
importance on regulatory stakeholders as failure to comply with regulatory demands
can result in potential liabilities, fines, penalties, and clean-up costs (Bansal and
Clelland, 2004). Furthermore, managers may perceive pressure from regulatory
stakeholders because of the potential organizational benefits that can be obtained from
compliance and working relationships with government. For example, environmental
proactivity has been shown to offer regulatory advantages by leading to greater
flexibility to adapt to legislative changes (Bansal and Bogner, 2002), the ability to
influence environmental laws and regulations (Faucheux et al., 1998; Hart, 1995;
Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Miles and Covin, 2000), and to reduce or avoid legal
liabilities (Hart, 1995; Rooney, 1993).
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Recently, environmental management has been one of the top issues on the

political agenda for government in China (Francesch-Huidobro et al., 2012; Yuan et
al., 2006). Governments at different levels (e.g., central, provinces, cities, and
counties) have launched a series of regulatory policies and market-based approaches
in order to motivate corporations to implement environmental management (Lo and
Fryxell, 2005; Ma and Ortolano 2000; Tang et al., 2003; Zhang et al., 2008).
Accordingly, we predict that perceived pressures from regulatory stakeholders will be
related to greater environmental proactivity:
H4: Perceived regulatory stakeholder pressure will be positively related to
environmental proactivity.
Environmental Proactivity and Competitive Advantage
Research examining the financial benefits to environmental performance has
tended to examine three main areas of competitive advantage: cost, reputation and
innovation (e.g., Delmas et al., 2011). Research done in developed countries has
found that environmental performance can reduce costs by lowering compliance
costs, reducing waste, improving efficiency and productivity, and reducing or
avoiding legal liabilities (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008; Hart, 1995; Hart and Ahuja,
1996; Rooney, 1993). Research has also found that environmental performance can
strengthen firm reputation both directly (Hart, 1995; Miles and Covin, 2000), and
indirectly through greater appeal to consumers (Miles and Covin, 2000),
improvements in legitimacy (Bansal and Clelland, 2004), and through the ability to
influence environmental laws and regulations (Faucheux et al., 1998; Hart, 1995;
Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Miles and Covin, 2000). Lastly, environmental performance
can lead to a competitive advantage related to innovation through product
differentiation (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008; Porter and van der Linde, 1995), the selling
of pollution control technology (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008), the creation of entry
13	
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barriers (Dean and Brown, 1995; Hart, 1995; Russo and Fouts, 1997), and the
development of new market opportunities and better access to markets (Ambec and
Lanoie, 2008). Whether these effects occur in a developing market remains unclear,
and in particular, we know of no research that has empirically examined the
relationship between environmental proactivity and competitive advantage in the
largest emerging market, China (Ye and Zhang, 2011).
Within China, as compared to most Western countries, firms tend to operate in
a fiercely low-cost external business environment. That is, currently China’s main
competitive advantage is its low-cost environment, established primarily through
relatively low wages. Since costs are already extremely low, it is likely to be highly
difficult to gain further cost advantages through environmental proactivity. We do,
however, still believe it is possible, but only when managers are ecologically
motivated.
If top management’s drive for environmental proactivity stems from an
ecological instead of a competitive motivation, the organizational culture and
leadership would be significantly different. That is, employees may recognize that a
firm’s environmental proactivity is not simply another means for management to
minimize costs, but is part of the organizational norm and something top management
believes as being the right thing to do (Bansal and Roth, 2000). This recognition and
ultimate embracement of environmental proactivity may then, paradoxically, result in
additional cost savings. Such cost savings may result from an organizational culture
that recognizes and rewards (financially or otherwise) ecological responsibility.
Likewise, this culture and leadership may drive mangers to make necessary short-term
investments to gain longer-term ecological and financial benefits. For example,
managers might be willing to purchase more efficient technology despite the upfront
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costs. Managers may also be more receptive to taking risks to further their
environmental proactivity as they feel obligated to do so based on their belief that it is
the right or ethical thing to do. Lastly, within such a culture employees are likely to be
more receptive to, and aware of finding, additional means to furthering environmental
proactivity. In sum, through the impact on managers and employees (Mayer et al.,
2009; Sharma, 2000; Somers, 2001), firms within China with ecologically motivated
senior executives may gain a cost competitive advantage to environmental proactivity
H5: The interaction between environmental proactivity and cost advantage
will have a positive association with ecological motivations.
In contrast, to gain a reputation advantage in China, we believe that firms must
be competitively motivated. In a systematic review of the corporate reputation
literature Walker (2010) noted that the most commonly used definition of reputation
comes from Fombrun (1996: 72) who defined it as “A perceptual representation of a
company’s past actions and future prospects that describes the firm’s overall appeal to
all of its key constituents when compared with other leading rivals”. This definition
clearly states that reputation is based on a comparison to rivals.
Accordingly, we believe that in order to gain a reputation advantage from
environmental proactivity managers need to be motivated by competition so that they
are always seeking to outperform their competitors, and are thus perceived as more
environmentally proactive to stakeholders. This is likely to result in a constant oneupping as these externally driven managers seek to have higher environmental
proactivity than rivals. Two points arise from this observation. First, because a firm’s
reputation is based on stakeholders’ expectations derived from a comparison to
“leading rivals” (Fombrun, 1996), if a firm is continuously outperforming the
environmental proactivity of competitors, they are likely to gain a reputation
advantage. Second, it is possible that for managers that are competitively motivated
15	
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their environmental proactivity is more symbolic than substantive (Walker and Wan,
2012), meaning they can gain a perceived reputational advantage but not a cost
advantage.
H6: The interaction between environmental proactivity and reputation
advantage will have a positive association with competitive motivations.
Lastly, while we believe that both cost and reputational advantages to
environmental proactivity will occur in China depending on managerial motivations,
we do not predict advantages related to greater innovation. In general, China has not
to date demonstrated an ability to develop world leading innovative green products or
services. In fact, if anything the opposite is true where Western firms have struggled
to maintain their environmentally responsible image when working with Chinese
firms that tend to have a poor environmental image (Lai and Wong, 2012).
Accordingly, we do not make a hypothesis for the relationship between environmental
proactivity and innovation. Despite the lack of a hypothesis we keep innovation in the
study as a non-significant relationship would be in contrast to findings in Western
countries (e.g., Delmas et al., 2011), and thus interesting in its own right.
Method
Context
This study was conducted in Zigong, a prefecture-level city of Sichuan
province in southwest China. China, one of the major industrializing countries with
rapid economic development in the past thirty years, is faced with a dilemma of
significant resource and environmental constraints. This is more evident in our
research site area, which is geographically distant from other major cities in China.
The city is well known for having varied manufacturing industries such as natural gas,
coal, inorganic chemicals, and salt production, thus it provides excellent research
facilities for understanding corporate environmental management by Chinese firms.
16	
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There is very little publicly available data on the environmental proactivity of

Chinese firms in general, and within the manufacturing industry in the province of
Sichuan there is also no publicly available data on corporate financial performance.
That is, there is no reliable secondary data available on environmental proactivity, its
antecedents, or its consequences. Accordingly, we collected primary data through
surveys with a multi-item scheme and with multiple respondents per firm (Delmas et
al. 2011).
We first obtained the complete company directory through the Bureau of
Commerce of Zigong (BCZ). After dropping firms that were not accessible or had
gone through bankruptcy, a total of 330 companies were included in the survey and
questionnaires were sent to them facilitated by BCZ, the Zigong Branch of Chengdu
Customs, and Zigong Environmental Protection Bureau (it is common to conduct
surveys in China through government authorities in order to increase response rates).
In order to minimize the risk of common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003), for
each company we used multiple respondents as we sought information on
environmental proactivity from environmental managers, and information on
competitive advantage, motivations and stakeholder pressures from top managers,
respectively. Environmental managers are in the best position to explain their
environmental strategy and managerial discretion as it relates to the natural
environment, and as the key decision makers top managers are in the best position to
explain the financial benefits, their motivations for environmental proactivity and
stakeholder pressures.
Some of the surveyed firms had specific people in charge of environmental
management (e.g., with titles such as departmental managers of environmental
management, general managers in charge of environmental management, etc.). For
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those without specific titles set up for environmental management, managers with the
best knowledge of internal environmental management (e.g., product managers,
project managers, R&D managers, security managers, etc.) filled out the
questionnaires. Top managers included vice-presidents, chairpersons, general
managers, or owners. Lastly, we dropped firms from the analysis that returned
questionnaires answered by single respondents, leaving us with a final usable data of
161 valid observations (response rate = 48.8%). That is, our final sample consisted of
322 participants in 161 firms.
The average age of our managers was 36 years old, 55 percent were male and
45 percent female, and over 80 percent had a University education at minimum.
Regarding their work experience, the mean number of years participants were with
their current company was six, the mean number of years they were in their current
position was five, and the mean number of years of managerial experience was six
and a half.
We developed each construct discussed in detail below based on work from
previous scholars (Darnall et al., 2010; Delmas et al., 2011; Hart, 2005; Nash and
Ehrenfeld, 1997; Welford, 1998), and a pilot test of 27 Chinese firms within our
specific research context. Lastly, prior to the pilot test we also asked industry experts
within China to check the face validity of our constructs for our setting (Delmas et al.
2011). To test the validity of dependent and independent variables we performed
exploratory factor analyses using principle component analysis with Varimax rotation.
Dependent Variables
Environmental

Proactivity.

A

proactive

environmental

strategy

is

characterized by a strong commitment to the natural environment going significantly
beyond legal requirements. This commitment is often demonstrated and measured
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through environmental operational improvements (e.g, waste reduction, closed-loop
systems, life-cycle analysis, employee training) and environmental reporting (e.g.,
internal and external accounting procedures, environmental indicators and goals,
sustainability reports) (Darnall et al. 2010; Delmas et al. 2011; Hart, 2005; Nash and
Ehrenfeld, 1997; Welford, 1998). Within these two broad measures we developed a
number of survey questions. Using a factor analysis we identified two valid
constructs, both of which had a single Eigen value above 1 and alpha’s of .70. The
first construct consisted of four items. It focused on environmental operational
improvements and asked respondents questions such as: Do you have an internal
assessment of the environmental impact of operations? Do you conduct a
comprehensive internal environmental audit? The second construct also consisted of
four items. It focused on environmental reporting and asked respondents questions
such as: Do you have environmental performance indicators/goals? Do you have a
formal environmental performance reporting system?
Competitive Advantage. The effect of environmental strategy on competitive
advantage has been examined by a number of authors (Christmann, 2000; Delmas et
al., 2011; Russo and Fouts, 1997). Given that financial performance data, and in
particular accounting measures, were not available for the firms in our sample we
used constructs developed by Delmas et al (2011) and added survey questions more
particular to our research context where applicable.
Competitive advantage was measured via three constructs: cost advantage,
reputation and innovation (Delmas et al., 2011). The examination of three areas of
competitive advantage permits a more nuanced investigation into the financial
benefits of environmental responsibility (Barnet, 2007). Each item was measured
using a 7-point Likert-type scale; all constructs had a single Eigen value above one,
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and the alpha’s for competitive advantage, reputation and innovation were as follows:
.73, .70 and .76 respectively.
The competitive advantage construct consisted of four items examining both
domestic and foreign competitors and asked respondents questions such as: We incur
lower compliance costs with regulations of environmental issues relative to our
domestic competitors; Overall, our environmental strategy improves our relative cost
position to foreign competitors.
The reputation construct consisted of two items and measured reputation
according to consumers (Delmas et al., 2011). The questions asked respondents to rate
the loyalty of existing customers and the attraction of new customers.
The innovation construct consisted of three items and asked respondents about
technology development, the development of new, or improvements in existing,
processes and operations, and the development of new, or improvements of existing
products.
Independent Variables
Motivations. Building off the qualitative research of Bansal and Roth (2000)
we developed scale items for two environmental motivations: competitive and
ecological responsibility.
Each item in our motivation variables were measured using a 7-point Likerttype scale; both constructs had a single Eigen value above one, and the alpha’s for a
competitive and an ecological motivation were as follows: .82 and .65 respectively.
The competitive motivation construct consisted of three items and asked
respondents questions such as: I chose to invest in environmental responsibilities that
will secure my firm with the highest returns; Environmental initiatives must be
commercially viable for me to invest in them. The ecological motivation construct
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consisted of four items and asked respondents questions such as: Firms have a
responsibility to invest in environmental initiatives; My company is environmentally
responsible because it is the right thing to do.
Stakeholder Pressure. The perceptions of managers are of critical importance
to understanding stakeholder influence and pressure (Banerjee, 2001; Donaldson and
Preston, 1995; Fineman and Clarke, 1996). In turn, managerial perceptions of the
stakeholder pressures then influence firm strategy (Darnall et al., 2010; Donaldson
and Preston, 1995; Fineman and Clarke, 1996; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999).
Correspondingly, using our survey we asked managers to rate the perceived pressures
from various stakeholders.
Given the context of our research in the province of Sichuan we focused on
external and regulatory stakeholders as per our hypotheses for stakeholder pressures.
Within China both internal (i.e., employees) and societal stakeholders (i.e., general
public, NGOs, unions, etc.) yield little power regarding the use of CSR practices of
firms (Lin, 2010; Tsoi, 2010). Importantly, this was confirmed in our data as we
included multiple groups of stakeholders but they did not produce valid or reliable
constructs.
Each construct was measured using a 7-point Likert-type scale where
respondents were asked to rate the importance of various stakeholders. Both
stakeholder pressure constructs had a single Eigen value above one, and the alpha’s
for external and regulatory stakeholder pressures were as follows: .74 and .70
respectively. External stakeholders included customers, suppliers, trade associations,
competitors and banks. Regulatory stakeholders included all three levels of
government relevant to our research context: municipal, provincial and central.
Control Variables
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Firm size. Size was included because larger firms tend to pollute more, and

studies have found that larger firms are more likely than smaller firms to integrate
environmental practices into their organizations (Chen, Lai and Wen, 2006; LopezGamero, Claver-Cortes and Molina-Azorin, 2008; Moore, 2001; Russo and Fouts,
1997). In addition, previous research has used size as a proxy for firm visibility as
highly visible companies are often under increased scrutiny from stakeholders
(Adams and Hardwick, 1998; Brammer and Millington, 2008). Increased firm
visibility could lead to higher costs associated with increased taxation, fines and
litigation for example. It might also lead to increased environmental responsibility as
these firms seek to appease the increased demands from stakeholders and to avoid or
pre-empt environmental legislation (Brammer and Millington, 2008). Firm size was
measured as the total number of employees (Darnall et al., 2010).
In addition, we partly controlled for firm size by only including firms with
more than 50 employees. We also created a measure for firm size which was broken
down within our sample as follows: 56 percent had between 51-100 employees, 30
percent had between 101-500 employees; six percent had between 501-1000
employees, and eight percent had between 1001-5000 employees.
Export orientation. Firms with greater export orientation may benefit from
showing their commitment to environmental protection because this may boost the
confidence of foreign customers (Christmann and Taylor, 2001; Darnall et al., 2010).
It was measured by following Darnall et al. (2010) by surveying whether the firm’s
market scope was local (i.e., export orientation =1), national (i.e., export orientation
=2), regional (i.e., export orientation =3), or global (i.e., export orientation =4). This
construct ranged from 1 to 4, with a mean value of 1.99 and a standard deviation of
.97.
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Firm age. Older firms have been shown to have greater environmental

responsibility (Darnall et al., 2010; Portney and Stavins, 2000). Age was measured as
the number of years in operation. The age range in our sample was from 1-73, with a
mean age of 14 years and a standard deviation of 12.
Industry type. Dummy variables were used to control for industry type.
Seventy-five percent of the firms in our sample were in manufacturing and 25 percent
in service.
Family business. Family businesses have been found to be more socially and
environmentally responsible than their peers (Sharma and Sharma, 2011). Only eight
percent of the companies in our sample were family run businesses.
Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations for our study variables are shown in
Table I.
-------------------------------------------------Insert Table I about here
---------------------------------------------------Motivation
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2—which predicted that a competitive and an
ecological responsibility motivation would be positively related to environmental
proactivity—we ran linear regressions across both our measures of environmental
proactivity (environmental operational improvements and environmental reporting) as
the dependent variables (see Table II).
-------------------------------------------------Insert Table II about here
----------------------------------------------------
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A competitiveness motivation was not related to either type of environmental

proactivity, thus we did not find support for Hypothesis 1. In contrast, ecological
responsibility had a significant positive relationship to both measures of
environmental proactivity: Environmental operational improvements (p < .01) and
environmental reporting (p < .10). Thus, Hypothesis 2 was supported
Stakeholder Pressure
To test Hypotheses 3 and 4—which predicted that perceived external and
regulatory stakeholder pressure would be positively related to environmental
proactivity—we ran linear regressions across both our measures of environmental
proactivity as the dependent variables (see Table II).
External stakeholder pressure was not significantly related to environmental
operational improvements, and it had a significant negative relationship to
environmental reporting (p < .001). Thus, Hypothesis 3 was not supported.
Regulatory stakeholder pressure had a significant positive relationship to both
measures of environmental proactivity: Environmental operational improvements (p <
.10) and environmental reporting (p < .001). Thus, Hypothesis 4 was supported.
The results for our antecedents to environmental proactivity are displayed in
Figure 2.
-------------------------------------------------Insert Figure 2 about here
---------------------------------------------------Competitive Advantage
To test Hypotheses 5 and 6 for the moderating effects of motivations we ran
four regressions that tested the interactions of motivation and environmental
proactivity by both types of competitive advantage: cost advantage and reputation
(see Table III). In addition, we included innovation to test the null hypothesis of no
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significant relationship among motivation, environmental proactivity and innovation.
Since we did not form a hypothesis we do not show the result in the Table, but as
predicted it was not significant.
We found three significant interactions (see Table III). First, the interaction
between one environmental proactivity measure (i.e., environmental operational
improvements) and an ecological responsibility motivation was significant and
positive for cost advantage (p < .01). We further examined this significant interaction
by plotting it in Figure 3 (Aiken and West, 1991). The plotted interaction shows that
for managers of firms with an ecological motivation as their environmental
operational improvements increased their perceived cost advantage increased. This is
in contrast to managers that are not ecologically motivated who perceived a decreased
cost advantage as their environmental operational improvements increased. This
significant interaction indicates that while the relationship between environmental
operational improvements and cost advantage is not significant, if the managers of a
firm are environmentally proactive (measured through operational improvements) and
they are ecologically motivated, there is a perceived positive and significant cost
advantage.
-------------------------------------------------Insert Table III about here
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Figure 3 about here
---------------------------------------------------Second, the interaction between the other measure of environmental
proactivity (i.e., environmental reporting) and an ecological responsibility motivation
was also significant and positive for cost advantage (p < .01). We further examined
this significant interaction by plotting it in Figure 4 (Aiken and West, 1991). The
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plotted interaction shows that for managers in firms with an ecological motivation, as
their environmental reporting increased their perceived cost advantage increased. This
is in contract to managers of firms that are not ecologically motivated who perceived
a decreased cost advantage as their environmental proactivity increased. Taking these
two significant interactions together, we find support for hypothesis H5 that proposed
that an ecological motivation would positively moderate the impact of environmental
proactivity on cost advantage.
-------------------------------------------------Insert Figure 4 about here
---------------------------------------------------Third, consistent with Hypothesis H6, the interaction between environmental
proactivity and a competitive motivation was significant and positive for reputation (p
< .05). However, it only occurred to environmental operational improvements and not
to environmental reporting. We further examined the significant interaction by
plotting it in Figure 5 (Aiken and West, 1991). The plotted interaction shows that for
managers in firms with a competitive motivation, as their environmental operational
improvements increased their perceived reputation advantage increased. This is in
contrast to managers in firms that are not competitively motivated who perceived a
decreased reputation advantage as their environmental proactivity increased. Thus we
obtain partial support for Hypothesis 6 in that a competitive motivation did moderate
the relationship between environmental operational improvements and a perceived
reputation advantage, but this relationship did not exist for environmental reporting.
-------------------------------------------------Insert Figure 5 about here
---------------------------------------------------Discussion
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Our results support the research contention that environmental proactivity is a

multi-dimensional construct and that the one-size-fits-all approach to environmental
management and research is limited and misleading (Barnett, 2007; Berchicci and
King, 2007; Brammer and Millington, 2008). Such support is evident in two ways:
First, our data indicates the existence of two types of environmental proactivity with
similarities and differences in regards to their respective antecedents and
consequences.

Second,

our

results

delineate

notable

differences

between

environmental proactivity in Western societies versus that in China. We examine the
latter point throughout the discussion.
We found that both an ecologically responsible motivation and perceived
regulatory stakeholder pressure had a significant positive relationship to both types of
environmental proactivity. The first finding indicates that in contrast to motivations
driven by competitiveness those driven by ecological responsibility further a firm’s
environmental proactivity. A large amount of research examining environmental
proactivity in Western countries has tried to encourage greater firm proactivity by
empirically identifying the financial benefits to doing so (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008;
Hart, 1995; Miles and Covin, 2000; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Porter and van der Linde,
1995; Russo and Fouts, 1997). However, our research of Chinese firms demonstrates
that a competitive motivation does not increase environmental proactivity. Only firms
that are ecologically driven have a significant and positive relationship to
environmental proactivity. Furthermore, the financial benefits measured through a
cost advantage appear to be attainable only when the firm is ecologically motivated
(as identified through our interaction effects). That is, there were no direct
relationships between our two types of environmental proactivity and cost advantage,
but when ecologically motivated, both types were related to significant cost
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advantages. Thus, Chinese managers seeking to gain cost advantages over their
competitors through their environmental proactivity must be motivated by the belief
that it is the right thing to do from a moral and ethical standpoint. It is possible that
without this motivation managers seek short cuts or are not fully committed to
environmental proactivity resulting in an inability to obtain any cost advantages.
Research has consistently found that government regulations can lead to
environmental proactivity (e.g., Marcus and Geffen, 1998; Majumdar and Marcus,
2001). It would appear that this effect also applies to China as perceived regulatory
stakeholder pressure had a significant and positive relationship to both types of
environmental proactivity. Through coercive pressures governments can motivate
environmental proactivity. This finding again demonstrates the ability of governments
to enforce environmental proactivity, as consistent with previous studies on corporate
environmental management of Chinese firms (Zhang et al., 2008; Zhu et al., 2007).
Contrary to what we hypothesized, perceived external stakeholder pressure
was negatively related to environmental reporting and not related to environmental
operational improvements. While researchers have found that external stakeholders
from developed countries are pressuring Chinese firms in their supply chain to
increase their environmental performance (Lai and Wong, 2012; Zhu et al., 2007), we
did not find evidence of this in our data. It may be that the specific external
stakeholders examined in our data (customers, suppliers, trade associations,
competitors and banks) are price driven and Chinese managers feel pressure to keep
costs as low as possible. For example, Chinese managers may not want to invest in
employee environmental training or internal and external environmental accounting
(items in our constructs) as such activities will increase short-term costs. Thus, even
though environmental proactivity may result in cost savings over time through things
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such as waste reduction and closed-loop systems, given the short-term costs of
implementation managers may not have been willing to invest the necessary amount
of firm resources given external stakeholder pressures for minimal costs.
Arguably, our most interesting findings relate to the examination of the
relationship between environmental proactivity and competitive advantage as tested in
the interaction effect terms. First, as expected, we did not find any signification
relationship between motivation, environmental proactivity and innovation. This
demonstrates the limited value of environmental proactivity related to innovation for
our sampled Chinese firms.
Second, to gain a reputation advantage through environmental proactivity
senior managers must be competitively motivated. This finding is entirely consistent
with the most commonly used definition of reputation (Walker, 2010) provided by
Fombrun (1996: 72) that implies competition with rivals. Given this conceptualization
of reputation it is not surprising that a reputational advantage to environmental
proactivity occurs when managers are competitively motivated. In other words, in
order to gain a reputation advantage, managers need to be motivated by competition
so that they are always seeking to do more than their competitors and are thus
perceived as the more environmental proactive firm to stakeholders.
Third, two significant interactions were identified between environmental
proactivity and cost advantage, which demonstrated that in order to gain a cost
competitive advantage through either type of environmental proactivity firms must be
ecologically motivated. This relationship is of particular interest given that we did not
find a significant direct relationship between environmental proactivity and cost
competitive advantage. Without being motivated by ecological responsibility
managers may not be willing to make the necessary short-term investments to
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ultimately gain a cost advantage over competitors. The paradox of these two findings
is that to gain a cost advantage managers cannot be motivated by competition, only by
ecological responsibility. Managers of firms that do gain a cost advantage to their
environmental proactivity will no doubt be pleased, but interestingly this is not why
they are engaged in environmental proactivity in the first place. It may be the case that
when top managers state that their motivation for environmental proactivity is ethical
or moral employees are more likely to embrace the proactivity as it filters down the
organization. This embracement may then result in additional cost savings as various
employees find the means through which to continue to improve the firm’s
environmental proactivity. Similarly, with the support of top management the
organizational culture will be strongly supportive of environmental proactivity.
Perhaps, only with a culture that embraces environmental proactivity as the ethical or
moral thing to do, are firms able to gain a cost competitive advantage.
Implications
Research implications. For researchers our implications are threefold: First,
with a dearth of research examining environmental proactivity in emerging markets
our research in China demonstrates the existence of environmental proactivity
(meaning a non-zero value for the measure) and some compelling differences and
similarities with research results from emerged markets. Given that both emerged and
emerging countries will need to be a part of the discussions and ultimate solutions to
global environmental problems such as climate change, our research demonstrates
that we have much to learn about environmental proactivity in emerging countries.
Second, our research supports the contention that environmental management
is not a universal prescription or a one-size-fits-all approach (Barnett, 2007; Berchicci
and King, 2007; Brammer and Millington, 2008). We found evidence of two types of
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environmental proactivity that had similarities and differences with regards to the
antecedents and consequences of proactivity, and some notable differences between
environmental proactivity in Western societies versus that in China. Differences
included (1) a non-significant relationship between a competitive motivation and
environmental proactivity, (2) a negative relationship between external stakeholders
and

environmental

proactivity,

(3)

a

non-significant

relationship

between

environmental proactivity and innovation, (4) a non-significant relationship between
environmental proactivity and a cost advantage but a significant relationship when
ecologically motivated, and (5) a non-significant relationship between environmental
proactivity and a reputation advantage but a significant relationship (to operational
improvements specifically) when competitively motivated. Furthermore, the use of
multiple forms of competitive advantage was substantiated in that we obtained very
different results across cost, reputation and innovation.
Third, we uncovered a paradox where managers must be motivated by
ecological responsibility to gain a perceived cost advantage. This is a compelling
result as it differs from research examining Western organizations, and provides
opportunities for future research to begin to examine this paradox in greater detail.
For example, does this paradox exist in other parts of China? Can we empirically
identify the reasons for its occurrence? Given that our results were self-reported, is the
perceived cost advantage actual, or are managers that engage in environmental
proactivity because they believe it is the right thing to do overly optimistic on the
financial benefits?
Managerial implications. For managers our implications are threefold: First,
both our measures of environmental proactivity are related to a cost competitive
advantage, but to obtain it, top managers must paradoxically be motivated by

31	
  
	
  

32	
  
	
  

Is the Red Dragon Green?

ecological responsibility, not competition. Managers seeking to gain a cost advantage
must create a culture that believes in environmental proactivity because it is the right
thing to do (Bansal and Roth, 2000), and not because they seek to minimize costs.
Second, while there was no direct relationship between environmental operational
improvements and a reputation competitive advantage, managers can gain this
advantage as long as they are motivated by competition. Therefore, managers cannot
gain a cost advantage when their environmental proactivity is motivated by
competition, but they can gain a reputation advantage. Third, we found no significant
relationships related to innovation. Knowing this, if managers could conscientiously
attempt to further innovation through environmental proactivity they could potentially
be in unique possession of an innovation competitive advantage.
Policy implications. For policy makers our implications are threefold: First, if
your goal is to increase the environmental proactivity in China you are succeeding in
that the managers in our sample felt pressured by regulatory stakeholders to become
proactive. Second, in making appeals to further corporate environmental proactivity,
our data suggests that the best means to do so would be to make arguments that it is
the ethical or moral thing to do (ecological responsibility). Arguments based on
competition, such as arguing that it will improve the bottom-line, are not strongly
supported in our data. Paradoxically, arguments based on ethical or moral appeals can
be sold by stating that only with such motivation can competitive gains in cost be
obtained. Third, the lack of any significant relationships to an innovation competitive
advantage should be troubling to policy makers in China. Firm innovation is
necessary for competitiveness and if Chinese firms are not innovating as it relates to
environmental proactivity it may mean that they are seeking such innovation

32	
  
	
  

33	
  
	
  

Is the Red Dragon Green?

elsewhere. Policy makers may want to create policies to encourage home grown
environmental innovation.
Limitations and Future Research
Our study had two main limitations. First, we discussed our results as though
they were representative of all of China. However, our findings are specific to the city
of Zigong located in the Sichuan province in southwest China, and they may not
generalize beyond this location. That said, we purposely selected Zigong given that
this area typifies most corporations (including small and medium sized enterprises) in
such a transitional economy and their felt pressures or motivations related to proactive
environmental management practices. Future research will have to investigate other
parts of China to see if our results are generalizable.
Second, there was no archival and publicly available data for any of our
measures within our study context, and it was therefore necessary to use crosssectional survey data. While such data has its advantages over archival publicly
available data (Delmas et al., 2011) we were not able to conduct a longitudinal
investigation or use more objective measures for our constructs. In the future,
researchers may be in a position to examine environmental proactivity longitudinally
and perhaps using secondary data within our study context.
Conclusion
We empirically identified a number of antecedents and consequences to
environmental proactivity in China. In particular, we found that ecological
motivations and regulatory stakeholder pressure were positively related to both types
of environmental proactivity, and that external stakeholder pressure was negatively
related to environmental reporting. Furthermore, we found that (1) if a firm was
environmentally proactive (as it relates to either measure) and they were ecologically
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motivated, there was a positive and significant cost advantage, and (2) if a firm makes
use of environmental operational improvement and they were competitively
motivated, there was a positive and significant reputation advantage.
Despite being the world’s second largest economy, the largest emitter of
carbon dioxide, and a country that burns twice as much coal as the United States
(Gore, 2009), we know surprisingly little about environmental proactivity in China.
One of the most influential Chinese spiritual leaders Lao Tzu stated “A journey of a
thousand miles must begin with a single step” (Dyer, 2008). We hope our study sheds
light on this journey, as China’s involvement in global environmental proactivity is a
must if we are to overcome the major environmental problems we face today.

34	
  
	
  

35	
  
	
  

Is the Red Dragon Green?

References
Aldrich, H.E. and C.M. Fiol: 1994, 'Fools Rush in? the Institutional Context of
Industry Creation', Academy of Management Review 19(4), 645-670.
Ambec, S. and P. Lanoie: 2008, 'Does it Pay to be Green? A Systematic Overview',
Academy of Management Perspectives 22(4), 45-62.
Amit, R. and P.J.H. Schoemaker: 1993, 'Strategic Assets and Organizational Rent',
Strategic Management Journal 14(1), 33-46.
Anderson, L.M. and T.S. Bateman: 2000, 'Individual Environmental Initiative:
Championing Natural Environmental Issues in U.S. Business Organizations',
Academy of Management Journal 43(4), 548-570.
Aragón-Correa, J.A. and S. Sharma: 2003, 'A Contingent Resource-Based View of
Proactive Corporate Environmental Strategy', Academy of Management Review 28(1),
71-88.
Aragón-Correa, J.: 1998, 'Research Notes. Strategic Proactivity and Firm Approach to
the Natural Environment', Academy of Management Journal 41(5), 556-567.
Arora, S. and T.N. Cason: 1996, 'Why do Firms Volunteer to Exceed Environmental
Regulations? Understanding Participation in EPA's 33/50 Program ', Land Economics
72(4), 413-432.
Banerjee, S.B.: 2001, 'Managerial Perceptions of Corporate Environmentalism:
Interpretations from Industry and Strategic Implications for Organizations', Journal of
Management Studies 38(4), 489-513.
Banerjee, S.B., E.S. Iyer and R.K. Kashyap: 2003, 'Corporate Environmentalism:
Antecedents and Influence of Industry Type', Journal of Marketing 67(2), 106-122.
Bansal, P. and J. Gao: 2006, 'Building the Future by Looking at the Past: Examining
Published Research in Organizations and Environment', Organization & Environment
19(4), 458-478.
Bansal, P. and W.C. Bogner: 2002, 'Deciding on ISO 14001: Economics, Institutions,
and Context', Long Range Planning 35(3), 269-290.
Bansal, P. and K. Roth: 2000, 'Why Companies Go Green: A Model of Ecological
Responsiveness', Academy of Management Journal 43(4), 717-736.
Berchicci, L. and A. King: 2007, 'Chapter 11: Postcards from the Edge', Academy of
Management Annals 1(1), 513-547.
Berrone, P., C. Cruz, L. Gomez-Mejia and M. Larraza-Kintana: 2010,
'Socioemotional Wealth and Corporate Responses to Institutional Pressures: Do
35	
  
	
  

36	
  
	
  

Is the Red Dragon Green?

Family-Controlled Firms Pollute Less?', Administrative Science Quarterly 55(1), 82113.
Berrone, P. and L. Gomez-mejia: 2009, 'Environmental Performance and Executive
Compensation: An Integrated Agency-Institutional Perspective', Academy of
Management Journal 52(1), 103-126.
Boiral, O.: 2007, 'Corporate Greening through ISO 14001: A Rational Myth?',
Organization Science 18(1), 127-146.
Bragdon, H. and J. Marlin: 1972, 'Is Pollution Profitable?', Risk Management 19(4), 918.
Brammer, S. and A. Millington: 2008, 'Does it Pay to be Different? An Analysis of
the Relationship between Corporate Social and Financial Performance', Strategic
Management Journal 29(12), 1325-1343.
Buysse, K. and A. Verbeke: 2003, 'Proactive Environmental Strategies: A Stakeholder
Management Perspective', Strategic Management Journal 4(5), 453-470.
Cheah, E., D. Jamali, J.E.V. Johnson and Ming-Chien Sung: 2011, 'Drivers of
Corporate Social Responsibility Attitudes: The Demography of Socially Responsible
Investors', British Journal of Management 22(2), 305-323.
Child, J. and T. Tsai: 2005, 'The Dynamic between Firms' Environmental Strategies
and Institutional Constraints in Emerging Economies: Evidence from China and
Taiwan', Journal of Management Studies 42(1), 95-125.
Christmann, P.: 2000, 'Effects of "Best Practices" of Environmental Management on
Cost Advantage: The Role of Complementary Assets', Academy of Management
Journal 43(4), 663-680.
Christmann, P. and G. Taylor: 2001, 'Globalization and the Environment:
Determinants of Firm Self-Regulation in China', Journal of International Business
Studies 32(3), 439-458.
Clelland, I.J., T.J. Douglas and D.A. Henderson: 2006, 'Testing Resource-Based and
Industry Factors in a Multi-Level Model of Competitive Advantage Creation',
Academy of Strategic Management Journal 5, 1-24.
Dahlmann, F. and S. Brammer: 2011, 'Exploring and Explaining Patterns of
Adaptation and Selection in Corporate Environmental Strategy in the USA',
Organization Studies 32(4), 527-553.
Darnall, N., I. Henriques and P. Sadorsky: 2010, 'Adopting Proactive Environmental
Strategy: The Influence of Stakeholders and Firm Size', Journal of Management
Studies 47(6), 1072-1094.
Davis, G.F. and T.A. Thompson: 1994, 'A Social Movement Perspective on Corporate
Control', Administrative Science Quarterly 39(1), 141-173.
36	
  
	
  

37	
  
	
  

Is the Red Dragon Green?

de Villiers, C., V. Naiker and C.J. van Staden: 2011, 'The Effect of Board
Characteristics on Firm Environmental Performance', Journal of Management 37(6),
1636-1663.
Dean, T.J. and R.L. Brown: 1995, 'Pollution Regulation as a Barrier to New Firm
Entry: Initial Evidence and Implications for Future Research', Academy of
Management Journal 38(1), 288-303.
Delmas, M.A., V.H. Hoffmann and M. Kuss: 2011, 'Under the Tip of the Iceberg:
Absorptive Capacity, Environmental Strategy, and Competitive Advantage', Business
& Society 50(1), 116-154.
Delmas, M.A. and M. Montes-Sancho: 2010, 'Voluntary Agreements to Improve
Environmental Quality: Symbolic and Substantive Cooperation', Strategic
Management Journal 31(6), 575-601.
Delmas, M.A. and I. Montiel: 2008, 'The Diffusion of Voluntary International
Management Standards: Responsible Care, ISO 9000, and ISO 14001 in the Chemical
Industry', Policy Studies Journal 36(1), 65-93.
Delmas, M.A. and M.W. Toffel: 2008, 'Organizational Responses to Environmental
Demands: Opening the Black Box', Strategic Management Journal 29(10), 10271055.
DiMaggio, P.J. and W.W. Powell: 1983, 'The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields', American
Sociological Review 48(2), 147-160.
Donaldson, T. and L.E. Preston: 1995, 'The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation:
Concepts, Evidence, and Implications', Academy of Management Review 20(1), 65-91.
Dyer, W.: 2008, Change Your Thoughts—Change Your Life: Living the Wisdom of the
Tao, (Hay House).
Faucheux, S., I. Nicolai and M. O’Connor: 1998, 'Globalization, Competitiveness,
Governance and Environment: What Prospects for a Sustainable Development?', in S.
Faucheux and J. Gowdy (eds.), Sustainability and Firms, Technological Change and
the Changing Regulatory Environment, (Massachusetts, Edward Elgar Publishing).
Fineman, S. and K. Clarke: 1996, 'Green Stakeholders: Industry Interpretations and
Response', Journal of Management Studies 33(6), 715-730.
Fogler, H.R. and F. Nutt: 1975, 'A Note on Social Responsibility and Stock
Valuation', Academy of Management Journal 18(1), 155-160.
Fombrun, C.: 1996, ‘Reputation: Realizing Value from the Corporate Image’ (Boston,
MA, Harvard Business School Press).
Francesch-Huidobro, M., C.W. Lo and S. Tang: 2012, 'The Local Environmental
Regulatory Regime in China: Changes in Pro-Environment Orientation, Institutional
37	
  
	
  

38	
  
	
  

Is the Red Dragon Green?

Capacity, and External Political Support in Guangzhou', Environment and Planning A
44(10), 2493-2511.
Freeman, R.: 1984, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, (Boston, MA,
Pitman).
Gao, Y.: 2009, 'Corporate Social Performance in China: Evidence from Large
Companies', Journal of Business Ethics 89(1), 23-25.
Gonzalez-Benito, J. and O. Gonzalez-Benito: 2006, 'A Review of Determinant Factors
of Environmental Proactivity', Business Strategy & the Environment 15(2), 87-102.
Gore, A.: 2009, our Choice: A Plan to Solve the Climate Crisis (Emmaus, PA, Rodale
Inc).
Hart, S.L.: 2005, Capitalism at the Crossroads: The Unlimited Business Opportunities
in Solving the World’s most Difficult Problems, (Upper Saddle River, NJ, Wharton
School Publishing).
Hart, S.L. and G. Ahuja: 1996, 'Does it Pay to be Green? An Empirical Examination
of the Relationship between Emission Reduction and Firm Performance', Business
Strategy & the Environment 5(1), 30-37.
Hart, S.L.: 1995, 'A Natural-Resource-Based View of the Firm', Academy of
Management. Academy of Management Review 20(4), 986.
Henriques, I. and P. Sadorsky: 1996, 'The Determinants of an Environmentally
Responsive Firm: An Empirical Approach', Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 30(3), 381-395.
Hillman, A.J. and M.A. Hitt: 1999, 'Corporate Political Strategy Formulation: A
Model of Approach, Participation, and Strategy Decisions', Academy of Management
Review 24(4), 825-842.
Howard-Grenville, J.: 2007, 'Developing Issue-Selling Effectiveness Over Time:
Issue Selling as Resourcing', Organization Science 18(4), 560-577.
Huang, P., X. Zhang and X. Deng: 2006, 'Survey and Analysis of Public
Environmental Awareness and Performance in Ningbo, China: A Case Study on
Household Electrical and Electronic Equipment', Journal of Cleaner Production
14(18), 1635-1643.
Hunt, C.B. and E.R. Auster: 1990, 'Proactive Environmental Management: Avoiding
the Toxic Trap', Sloan Management Review 31(2), 7-18.
Ip, P.: 2008, 'Corporate Social Responsibility and Crony Capitalism in Taiwan',
Journal of Business Ethics 79(1), 167-177.

38	
  
	
  

39	
  
	
  

Is the Red Dragon Green?

Jamali, D.: 2008, 'A Stakeholder Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility: A
Fresh Perspective into Theory and Practice', Journal of Business Ethics 82(1), 213231.
Judge, W. and T. Douglas: 1998, 'Performance Implications of Incorporating Natural
Environmental Issues into the Strategic Planning Process: An Empirical Assessment',
Journal of Management Studies 35(2), 241-262.
Kassinis, G. and N. Vafeas: 2006, 'Stakeholder Pressures and Environmental
Performance', Academy of Management Journal 49(1), 145-159.
Klassen, R.D. and D.C. Whybark: 1999, 'The Impact of Environmental Technologies
on Manufacturing Performance', Academy of Management Journal 42(6), 599-615.
Kolk, A. and J. Pinkse: 2008, 'A Perspective on Multinational Enterprises and Climate
Change: Learning from "an Inconvenient Truth"?', Journal of International Business
Studies 39(8), 1359-1378.
Lai, K. and C.W.Y. Wong: 2012, 'Green Logistics Management and Performance:
Some Empirical Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Exporters', Omega 40(3),
267-282.
Lau, J. and P. Waldmeir: 2010, 'Fears Grow Over China Labour Unrest', Financial
Times June(11), 16.
Lee, M.: 2011, 'Configuration of External Influences: The Combined Effects of
Institutions and Stakeholders on Corporate Social Responsibility Strategies', Journal
of Business Ethics 102(2), 281-298.
Lee, S.Y. and Seung-Kyu Rhee: 2007, 'The Change in Corporate Environmental
Strategies: A Longitudinal Empirical Study', Management Decision 45(2), 196-216.
Li, W. and R. Zhang: 2010, 'Corporate Social Responsibility, Ownership Structure,
and Political Interference: Evidence from China', Journal of Business Ethics 96(4),
631-645.
Liu, W. and D. Lu: 2002, 'Rethinking the Development of Economic Geography in
Mainland China', Environment and Planning A 34(12), 2107-2126.
Liu, X., B. Liu, T. Shishime, Q. Yu, J. Bi and T. Fujitsuka: 2010, 'An Empirical Study
on the Driving Mechanism of Proactive Corporate Environmental Management in
China', Journal of Environmental Management 91(8), 1707-1717.
Li-Wen Lin: 2010, 'Corporate Social Responsibility in China: Window Dressing Or
Structural Change?', Berkeley Journal of International Law 28(1), 64-100.
Lo, C.W., G.E. Fryxell and B. Van Rooij: 2009, 'Changes in Enforcement Styles
among Environmental Enforcement Officials in China', Environment and Planning A
41(11), 2706-2723.
39	
  
	
  

40	
  
	
  

Is the Red Dragon Green?

Lo, C.W. and G.E. Fryxell: 2005, 'Governmental and Societal Support for
Environmental Enforcement in China: An Empirical Study in Guangzhou', The
Journal of Development Studies 41(4), 558-588.
Ma, X. and L. Ortolano: Environmental Regulation in China: Institutions,
Enforcement, and Compliance, (NY, Rowan and Littlefield Publishers).
Madsen, P.M.: 2009, 'Does Corporate Investment Drive a "Race to the Bottom" in
Environmental Protection? A Reexamination of the Effect of Environmental
Regulation on Investment', Academy of Management Journal 52(6), 1297-1318.
Marcus, A. and D. Geffen: 1998, 'The Dialectics of Competency Acquisition:
Pollution Prevention in Electric Generation', Strategic Management Journal 19(12),
1145-1168.
Mayer, D.M., M. Kuenzi, R. Greenbaum, M. Bardes and R. Salvador: 2009, 'How
Low does Ethical Leadership Flow? Test of a Trickle-Down Model', Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes 108(1), 1-13.
Meyer, J. and B. Rowan: 1977, 'Institutional Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth
and Ceremony', American Journal of Sociology 83, 340-363.
Miles, M.P. and J.G. Covin: 2000, 'Environmental Marketing: A Source of
Reputational, Competitive, and Financial Advantage', Journal of Business Ethics
23(3), 299-311.
Milstein, M., S. Hart and A. York: 2002, 'Coercion Breeds Variation: The Differential
Impact of Isomorphic Pressures on Environmental Strategies', in A. Hoffman and M.
Ventresca (eds.), Organizations, Policy, and the Natural Environment. (Stanford,
California, Stanford University Press), pp. 151-172.
Mitchell, R.K., B.R. Agle and D.J. Wood: 1997, 'Toward a Theory of Stakeholder
Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and what really Counts',
Academy of Management. Academy of Management Review 22(4), 853-886.
Murillo-Luna, J., C. Garcés-Ayerbe and P. Rivera-Torres: 2008, 'Why do Patterns of
Environmental Response Differ? A Stakeholders' Pressure Approach', Strategic
Management Journal 29(11), 1225-1240.
Pacala, S.: 2004, 'Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50
Years with Current Technologies', Science 305(5686), 968-972.
Pfeffer, J. and G. Salancik: 1978, the External Control of Organizations: A Resource
Dependence Perspective, (New York, Harper and Row).
Porter, M.E. and C. van der Linde : 1995, 'Toward a New Conception of the
Environment-Competitiveness Relationship', Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(4),
97-118.

40	
  
	
  

41	
  
	
  

Is the Red Dragon Green?

Roome, N. and F. Wijen: 2006, 'Stakeholder Power and Organizational Learning in
Corporate Environmental Management', Organization Studies 27(2), 235-263.
Rooney, C.: 1993, 'Economics of Pollution Prevention: How Waste Reduction Pays',
Pollution Prevention Review 3(summer), 261-276.
Rueda-Manzanares, A., J.A. Aragón-Correa and S. Sharma: 2008, 'The Influence of
Stakeholders on the Environmental Strategy of Service Firms: The Moderating
Effects of Complexity, Uncertainty and Munificence', British Journal of Management
19(2), 185-203.
Schaefer, A.: 2007, 'Contrasting Institutional and Performance Accounts of
Environmental Management Systems: Three Case Studies in the UK Water &
Sewerage Industry', Journal of Management Studies 44(4), 506-535.
Sharfman, M.P. and C.S. Fernando: 2008, 'Environmental Risk Management and the
Cost of Capital', Strategic Management Journal 29(6), 569-592.
Sharfman, M.P., T.M. Shaft and L. Tihanyi: 2004, 'A Model of the Global and
Institutional Antecedents of High-Level Corporate Environmental Performance',
Business & Society 43(1), 6-36.
Sharma, P. and S. Sharma: 2011, 'Drivers of Proactive Environmental Strategy in
Family Firms', Business Ethics Quarterly 21(2), 309-334.
Sharma, S.: 2000, 'Managerial Interpretations and Organizational Context as
Predictors of Corporate Choice of Environmental Strategy', Academy of Management
Journal 43(4), 681-697.
Sharma, S. and I. Henriques: 2005, 'Stakeholder Influences on Sustainability Practices
in the Canadian Forest Products Industry', Strategic Management Journal 26(2), 159180.
Sharma, S. and H. Vredenburg: 1998, 'Proactive Corporate Environmental Strategy
and the Development of Competitively Valuable Organizational Capabilities',
Strategic Management Journal 19(8), 729-753.
Siegel, P.H. and S. Agrawal: 1997, 'Organizational and Professional Socialization:
Institutional Isomorphism in an Accounting Context', Mid-Atlantic Journal of
Business 33(1), 49-68.
Somers, M.J.: 2001, 'Ethical Codes of Conduct and Organizational Context: A Study
of the Relationship between Codes of Conduct, Employee Behavior and
Organizational Values', Journal of Business Ethics 30(2), 186-195.
Su, Y.L. and Seung-Kyu Rhee: 2007, 'The Change in Corporate Environmental
Strategies: A Longitudinal Empirical Study', Management Decision 45(2), 196-216.
Tang, S., C.W. Lo and G.E. Fryxell: 2003, 'Enforcement Styles, Organizational
Commitment, and Enforcement Effectiveness: An Empirical Study of Local
41	
  
	
  

42	
  
	
  

Is the Red Dragon Green?

Environmental Protection Officials in Urban China', Environment and Planning A
35(1), 75-94.
Tang, S. and X. Zhan: 2008, 'Civic Environmental NGOs, Civil Society, and
Democratisation in China', Journal of Development Studies 44(3), 425-448.
Tao, J. and D.N. Mah: 2009, 'Between Market and State: Dilemmas of Environmental
Governance in China's Sulphur Dioxide Emission Trading System', Environment and
Planning C: Government and Policy 27(1), 175-188.
Turban, D.B. and D.W. Greening: 1997, 'Corporate Social Performance and
Organizational Attractiveness to Prospective Employees', Academy of Management
Journal 40(3), 658-672.
Van Rooij, B.: 2006, Regulating Land and Pollution in China: Lawmaking,
Compliance, and Enforcement; Theory and Cases, (Leiden, Leiden Univ. Press).
Walker, K.: 2010, 'A Systematic Review of the Corporate Reputation Literature:
Definition, Measurement, and Theory', Corporate Reputation Review 12(4), 357-387.
Walker, K. and Wan, F. 2012. ‘The Harm of Symbolic Actions and Green-Washing:
Corporate Actions and Communications on Environmental Performance and Their
Financial Implications Journal of Business Ethics 109(2), 227-242.	
  
Wang, H. and C. Qian: 2011, 'Corporate Philanthropy and Corporate Financial
Performance: The Roles of Stakeholder Response and Political Access', Academy of
Management Journal 54(6), 1159-1181.
Whiteman, G. and W.H. Cooper: 2011, 'Ecological Sensemaking', Academy of
Management Journal 54(5), 889-911.
Yang, G.B.: 2005, 'Environmental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics in China', The
China Quarterly 181, 46-66.
Ye, K. and R. Zhang: 2011, 'Do Lenders Value Corporate Social Responsibility?
Evidence from China', Journal of Business Ethics 104(2), 197-206.
Yuan, Z., J. Bi and Y. Moriguichi: 2006, 'The Circular Economy: A New
Development Strategy in China', Journal of Industrial Ecology 10(1-2), 4-8.
Zhang, B., J. Bi, Z. Yuan, J. Ge, B. Liu and M. Bu: 2008, 'Why do Firms Engage in
Environmental Management? an Empirical Study in China', Journal of Cleaner
Production 16(10), 1036-1045.
Zhu, Q., J. Sarkis and K. Lai: 2007, 'Green Supply Chain Management: Pressures,
Practices and Performance within the Chinese Automobile Industry', Journal of
Cleaner Production 15(11), 1041-1052.

42	
  
	
  

